David Beaty and Punting

After some discussion earlier this week in one of our roundtables, I got it into my head to look up what KU did on fourth down in 2017.

Every fourth down.

All 129 of them, in fact, which you can view on this Google Sheet if you wish.

For the sake of readability, I won’t post them all here. Instead, I’ll focus on two sheets.

On this first one, we look at every “fourth-and-short” situation, which I defined as two yards to go or less.

As you can see, the Jayhawks faced 22 fourth-and-short situations. They punted on 11 of them, exactly 50%, including one time when KU was in “Plus Territory” (past the 50-yard line). In these situations, when KU elected to go for it, they converted 6-10.

I honestly don’t think that there are a lot of questionable calls here, although you could make a case to take issue with the playcalling on the first two opportunities during the Texas Tech game. Both of those fourth-and-1s, if I’m not mistaken, were off-tackle plays that predictably got blown up.

This may sound silly, but the two calls I have the most issue with are the ones against Oklahoma. It’s early in the game, you’re playing the #4 team in the country, and you’re not willing to be aggressive and put the pressure on them? This makes no sense to me.

This next table is all of KU’s fourth downs in Plus Territory:

KU had 47 fourth-down opportunities in plus territory. They punted 11 times. They attempted 18 field goals, making 15 of them. They went for it 18 times, converting 11 times.

This list I have a lot more issue with. Let’s begin at the top. Against SEMO, I can understand punting in that situation, as it was 4th-and-13. But part of me still thinks you go ahead and go for it there against an inferior opponent.

Now how about against Central Michigan? It’s late in the third quarter and you’re down 11 points. You’re at their 41-yard line. You need to go for it. Instead, you punt, they get the ball at the 9-yard line, and 11 plays later are dancing in the end zone with an 18-point lead.

Or how about the second and third quarter opportunities against West Virginia? You’re the underdog. Act like it!

I’ve already talked about the first two fourth downs against Texas Tech, but what do you have to gain by punting in Plus Territory down FOUR TOUCHDOWNS in the SECOND QUARTER?

The punt against K-State in the second quarter still makes me angry to this day. Also not sure why you punt there later in that same game early in the third quarter down 11 points when it’s just fourth-and-three.

And finally, against Texas, early in the third quarter. You’re on their side of the field. You only need three yards. You are down 18 points. Why are you punting there?

Final Thoughts

There’s a lot to digest here. Overall, I do think it’s fair to criticize David Beaty for his fourth down decisions, based primary on that second table. He’s coaching football games straight up, almost as if his team is just as good as their opponent. Unfortunately, that isn’t the case.

All told, Kansas “went for it” on fourth down 24 times last year, converting 13 times (link to stats). Those 24 attempts put KU tied for 12th-most, which is a little misleading - 30 teams went for it more than Kansas. Of those 30 teams, only 10 won fewer than five games in 2017.

Northwestern (10-3) and Florida Atlantic (11-3) went for it the most, at 39 times.

If you take seven of the punts in plus territory and go for it instead (I’m excluding the SEMO game here), that puts KU at 31 attempts, which would have been good for seventh-most, and would have had the benefit of possibly changing the eventual outcome of some of those games.

Kansas needs to take chances. I keep repeating this stat: they lost seven of nine conference games by 22 or more points. Punting on fourth-and-seven from midfield isn’t playing to win. It’s playing to lose by 40 instead of 50.